On the idea of terrorism, things get complicated. I actually find the idea that lone wolf shooters are white and the media doesn't call white terrorists, terrorists suspect. The media narrative around Timothy McVeigh or various IRA bombings in the 1990s, they were clearly defined as terrorists. Mass shooters weren't though, and at the time, there was no legal reason to do so. This is not to say dispropriate hysteria is not applied to non-white "terror" attacks and mass shootings are treated as terror in those cases by the media often. Prior to the 2000s, if you don't know the motive for a killing, you don't know if it is terrorism. The first mass shooters weren't terrorists because they have no objective beyond the act itself. If any act of violence is terrorism because it is violent, then the category has no real meaning.
Now, by federal statute, terrorism is defined by motive and only domestic attacks carried out at the behest of or on the behalf of foreign organizations. There is no federal charge for domestic terrorism, but there are state-level charges. Nevada defines terrorism solely be scale and targets, and mass shootings count. The media figures don't know that I am guessing because there are 50 sets of laws that apply here.
There are all sorts of biases at play but seems like expanding the category of terrorism to encompass all sorts of random or semi-random violence just increases the arbitrariness of state charges. The expansion of state-level terrorism laws was a product of the Bush-Obama period, but there is no standard legal definition, and encouraging an expanded popular definition seems to be operating on the idea that if everyone is oppressed together, then the privilege will go away.
Then comes gun control arguments, and I feel like I always to add a bunch of caveats: I am not anti-gun control and I am not a second amendment fetishist. However, I am a little tired of the " if it was only as hard to get a gun as it is a car" In most states, this simply isn't true. There are states in the West and the South where it is very easy to get a gun, but you don't have to pass a safety check, get a background check, in some states a mental health check, and go through a waiting period to a driver's license in most states. You have to be of age and pass a test, and maybe go through a probationary phase with use restrictions. As study after study shows, there is no strong relationship between state- and city-level gun control laws and gun crime.
IF you want to be honest, admit that the philosophy federalism over most regulation is a problem, but then admit that your issue is larger than the second amendment. There is no way to ad hoc this problem as many liberals say, but there is also little evidence even from international statistics that gun control alone will decrease the violence.
And as I have said many times, poverty reduction correlates more strong to decreased homicides than gun control if you look at international statistics. There is evidence that national level laws would have an effect on the margins, but very little if they would have an effect given state by state laws.
One would do well stop only mentioning rich countries with low historical rates of homicide before their gun control laws as your sole model. IF the laws are the same Mexico and UK but the gun-violence isn't then you cannot attribute the success to the legal regime. You would have to control for a other effects, including access created by the US border. In short, the study is beyond what I have seen either liberal or conservative outlets actually doing. Furthermore, looking at the current evidence and the likelihood of the kinds of gun deaths, gun regulation would likely have an effect on suicides more than any other category of crime. While Australia's example is often sited, the European trends of the last half-decade indicate that mass shootings as a method of political attack will likely happen despite strict gun regulation, but its hard to say, because while mass terror attacks are increasing, they are still incredibly statistically rare and our sample sizes are small. Many conservatives pointed that out in the Australia case, despite the reporting at Slate and Salon, that as, non-that-conservative L.A. Times points outs:
In both time periods, the total number of firearm-related deaths was on the decline. But “the trend accelerated” after gun control took effect, the researchers wrote.
The researchers also found that passage of the NFA was associated with a steep drop in the overall homicide rate. Before Port Arthur, homicides involving weapons of any kind had been falling at a rate of 0.3% per year, on average. Afterward, they fell by 3.1% per year. There was no evidence that killers who couldn't get their hands on guns switched to other weapons instead, the team wrote. . .
Overall, gun-related deaths fell faster after gun control than before it. But some of those gains might be due to factors that have nothing to do with guns. For instance, trauma doctors and surgeons have gotten better at treating gunshot victims. They’re also getting treated more rapidly in the NFA era, thanks in part to the growing ubiquity of cellphones, the researchers wrote.
In short, the most steady analysis of Australia doesn't produce clean data for either side and inclusion of statistics like that of Mexico, where similar laws are failed, we realize that even if the laws were passed, the laws themselves would not necessarily remotely effective policy.
This is not to say we don't need a dialogue about gun control, we do. But perhaps we can quit pretending that this is just about federal regulation, or the second amendment. Perhaps it isn't just a question of political will, which my liberals friends seem to think they can shame people into supporting, but a question of complex, multicausal social issues and a constitutional framework that is ill-equipped be coherent.
Pankaj Mishra is erudite and compelling as a writer, and yet, I have almost never been more frustrated by his writing or a popular critique of the Enlightenment. Mishra’s critique of globalization goes back to the Enlightenment’s philosophes and the various reactions and ressentiment that it exposes when the promises of development are realized upon. Yes, neoliberal snottiness and whiggish history plays villains, but Mishra wants to see this as a psychological development between modernity and its periphery. He traces 18th and 19th century reactions of Germany, Russia, and Italy as well as the parallel developments in Zionism, then in Iran, India, and among various kinds of Islamism, throwing in overlaps with Timothy McVeigh and Donald Trump. In short, Mishra attempts a grand theory of ressentiment.
Mishra places blame everywhere and nowhere for globalization’s elitism and the nationalism that emerges in reaction. After using Gabriele D’Annunzio as a cautionary anecdote, Mishra starts with the now obviously naive declarations of the end of the history and then jumps backwards to the conflict between Rousseau and Voltaire. Mishra’s sympathies are deeply with Rousseau even though he paints Rousseau as increasingly populist and even conservative in his battle with the philosophes. Mishra then jumps ahead to the Iranian revolution, Ataturk and Hitler, Herzl’s use of social Darwinism and his original liberal German nationalism, and the Mazzini inspired everyone from Hinduvtaists to Jabtinsky.
Mishra, however, traces genealogies in ways that link Islamists to Orthodox Christian thinkers, and shows that anti-Western thinkers were deeply schooled in Western thought. He also condemns the “compradors” such as Niapal and Rushie for lacking all nuance in their defense of the Enlightenment. Yet I am giving Mishra more of an argument that he allows. His genealogies are not maintained and often done by jumping between historical moments and movements to traces analogies and letting the juxtaposition stand as argument. By doing this, he is able to conflate different kinds of Enlightenment, modernity, and reactionaries. Religious nationalists and racialists are seen as having some response to the Enlightenment.
Mishra knows that capitalism and secularization have created brutal competitions, but he seems unwilling to go the way of Marxists in dealing with the limitations of capitalism. He condemns Marxism as mirroring capitalist thinkers belief in progress and essentially putting Protestant eschatology into a secular form, but Mishra doesn’t argue this from Marx’s words or even his actions but just asserts it. He, however, oddly defends Leninism, and still even more oddly doesn’t mention Adorno or Horkheimer’s similar critiques about the “Dialectics of the Enlightenment” nor does Mishra talk about the differences of Latin America’s experience of liberal modernity compares and contrasts with India and Iran, Russia and Germany.
Furthermore, Mishra far, far too often just name-drops and uses short hand to stand in for an argument. Take the following paragraph:
After all, Maxim Gorky, the Bolshevik, Muhammad Iqbal, the poet-advocate of “pure” I Islam, Martin Buber, the exponent of the “New Jew”, and Lu Xun, the campaigner for a “New Life” in China, as well as D’Annunzio, were all devotees of Nietzsche. Asian anti- imperialists and American robber barons borrowed equally eagerly from the 19th- century polymath Herbert Spencer, the first truly global thinker – who, after reading Darwin, coined the term “survival of the fittest”. Hitler revered Atatürk (literally “the father of the Turks”) as his guru; Lenin and Gramsci were keen on Taylorism, or “Americanism”; American New Dealers later borrowed from Mussolini’s “corporatism”.
Everything becomes everything else because they seem to rhyme or have overlapping influences even if the answers are diametrically opposed. Mishra has given himself a impossible task: to explain the move from rationalism to ressentiment without completely condemning the “West” or the response to it. Moving the definition of modernity and the precise ways it fails around, Mishra’s anecdotes are often insightful but his conclusions are milquetoast.
He does not explore masculinity and supposed feminization, he condemns Modi and Trump but is sympathetic to the romanticism and populism of which they seem like modern representations. Mishra’s argument that
“The key to man’s behaviour lies not in any clash of opposed civilizations, but, on the contrary, in irresistible mimetic desire: the logic of fascination, emulation and righteous self-assertion that binds the rivals inseparably. It lies in ressentiment, the tormented mirror games in which the West as well as its ostensible enemies and indeed all inhabitants of the modern world are trapped.”
Yet there are better and more coherent articulations of this: Isaiah Berlin’s histories of Russian and Counter-Enlightenment thought, Camus’s critique of revolutionary nihilism, even banal books like “Jihad Versus McWorld” from a decade ago are as insightful and far more sustained in their argument. This doesn’t mean that Mishra isn’t worth-reading: he is, but he ultimately doesn’t maintain his own argument and seems to think his he shows enough rhyming history, the point will be made for him.
In short, I am disappointed because this book starts to show how developing world and the West replicate the dialectic of Enlightenment that plagued “the West” itself, and it can’t keep its focus long enough to prove the point. Instead, one gets bloody-history quick cut with dread, which is justified, but with universal theory of the views of progress in trying to explain everything, doesn’t actually explain things very deeply at all.
THE TIBETAN BOOK OF THE DEAD: A BIOGRAPHY (LIVES OF GREAT RELIGIOUS BOOKS) BY DONALD LOPEZ (2011, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS)
In The Tibetan Book of the Dead: A Biography, Donald S. Lopez Jr. immediately hits the The Tibetan Book of the Dead out of the gate as not properly speaking a book, not really Tibetan, and not really about death. Now, it must be clear, that the several different collections of terma texts that up the various editions of the Nyingma text, the Bardo Todol, are Tibetan, but it isn’t one text and there isn’t even a set collection. Instead, The Tibetan Book of the Dead is largely a creation of theosophist and semi-professional orientalist, Walter Evans-Wentz.
Lopez starts us with a history of American crypto-archeology around religious texts starting with Joseph Smith in New York’s “burnt over” district and the revelation of reformed Egyptian and lost golden plates. This history comprises the first chapter, and the next chapters gives us context for Buddhism, and then compares implicitly compares the history of Mahayana textual “findings” and the specific Vajrayana traditions that involve finding “hidden” texts for later revelation and, again, the even more specific Nyingma traditions around terma, which were hidden scriptures that are found through reincarnations and access to Dakinis.
In a way, this contrast is both a condemnation and apologia for Evans-Wentz’s theosophical creation of The Tibetan Book of the Dead based off some obscure manuscripts in Tibetan found in the British protectorate of Sikkim at the end of the Victorian period that played against the Victorian schemas placing Theravada as a purer form of Buddhism and making the original Buddha a rationalist. This myth, one that still uses up today in popular Buddhist writings, is in some ways just as misleading as Evans-Wentz/Blavatsky theosophical story about Hindu hidden masters in Tibet.
Lopez then goes through the origins of the various introductions–Western converts without proper ordination claiming to be Lamas, Jung’s psychologizing and mythologizing of the text, the 70s re-translations and introduction of depth psychology even by Tibetan exiles to make an otherwise hyper-obscure text more appealing. The turning of the text into a self-help manual, and lastly, the more complete recent translation with a proper contextualization by the current Dalai Lama.
Now this is NOT a history of the Bardo Todol in Tibetan or its various manuscripts. That is handled by Bryan J. Cuevas’ The Hidden History of the Tibetan Book of the Dead. However, it is important to note that Cuevas and Lopez cite each other and are clearly in dialogue. Like so many of Lopez’s books, this is an excellent demystification if it can be dry in the minutiae it must go into to make its point.
Lopez’s second contribution is dedicated to the Lotus Sutra, unlike he did a treatment on the “Tibetan Book of the Dead and its text, the Lotus Sutra is important to Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism as well as the Japanese schools of Buddhism such as Tendei, Shin, Shingon, and, most dramatically, Nichiren Buddhism. The Lotus Sutra, among the other English named Mahayana sutras such as The Heart Sutra, which isn’t truly a sutra, and The Diamond Sutra, a key text for Chan/Seon/Zen Buddhism, is long and full of allegory and parable.
Lopez starts with the texts seem origins in the Sanskrit literature of the Indo-Greek world of Bactria. There is some speculations on the exact nature of the shift here. The secret doctrine elements of the text set it apart from the other two famous Mahayana sutras readily found in English. Lopez then talks us through the reception in China, the development of Chinese esoteric Buddhism, where The Lotus Sutra is put in a schema as revelation of doctrine it did not have in its Indo-Bactrian form. Then Lopez shifts focus to Japan, Japanese devotional and esoteric Buddhism(s), particularly in development of Tendai Buddhism and Nichiren Buddhism in particular, where it even plays a rule in quasi-religious wars before the Edo period. Then Lopez moves the reception of the Lotus Sutra in French and American scholarship and its role in early Orientalist scholarship. Lastly he Development of the modern Nichiren sects, their consolidation in the Meiji restoration at the same time as French-English scholarship on the Lotus sutra begins, Nichiren nationalist role in the war, and then the post-war development of Nichiren outside of Japan with Soka Gakkai being a highly evangelical form of Buddhism outside of Japan.
Lopez’s treatment here is fascinating and brings up many of the problems of the history of Buddhism and the Mahayana developments outside of India and outside of their original Sanskrit context. In many ways, the contrast between the two texts Lopez focuses on are telling: the Lotus Sutra an early, but found, Mahayana text from the classical period of Buddhist development when both the Pali and sanskrit (so-called ”Hinayana” nikyana schools such as defunct Sarvāstivāda and Sthaviras/Theravadans) cannons. However, these texts resembled gnostic texts in Christianity, a comparison Lopez notes, in that they are esoteric revelations that do doctrinally abnegate large portions of prior Buddhist doctrine. The Bardo Todol is a similarly esoteric text, but with a very late lineage and not theologically/doctrinally nearly as important. Indeed, while many of the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas from the Lotus Sutra are actually key in the Bardo Todol, the Dharma protectors and largely quasi-demonic figures of the Bardo Todol are more relevant to the transitions to the rebirth and are largely rooted in local traditions in Vajrayana Buddhism.
Furthermore, Lopez’s almost philological precision on their reception and commentary indicates that uses of both texts in the West are somewhat anachronistic and decontextualized from their original and their contemporary Asian use. The role of British and French colonialism and American obsession with Asian texts just after the US civil war to just before World War 1 play a huge role in the English-language reception and development of both texts. Both treatments are easily readable despite the obscurity of a lot of the topics involved, and offers a good history of Mahayana developments in America in particular through the lens of the textual reception. Highly recommended.
first published at former people
The test, predictably, failed, and this is probably why China was not as worried as they could be. Getting rid of Kim Jong Un is not a particularly high priority as a rabid buffer state is still a buffer state unless those claws get too sharp. A friend of mine sees this as another sign of US decline, but while the US power projection is declining, it also remains true that a rival hegemonic power doesn't emerge because the candidates aren't there. China is powerful, but has a severely slowed economy (although still faster than the developed ones, but people who know anything about growth patterns in economics shouldn't be surprised by that), Russia has a GDP of Italy and while it does have some serious ordinance, its ambitions seem to be purely regional to Eastern Europe despite a lot of the bluster. It hits harder militarily than its economy lets on, make no mistake, but Putin's concerns are limited to limiting NATO and keeping a Sunni block developing towards his Southern border. Europe leaders is a major power but still sees its bread buttered mostly in sync with the US even if individual countries oppose specific military action. BRICS never could correlate around united interests because honestly they don't clearly have united interests.
Always, but particularly now, the basics of political life and geo-political life are practical.
So, like the Roman Empire after the 3rd century, that decline may go awhile without anything really emerging to rival it. Furthermore, my normal response applies: capitalism does loom.
So South Koreans aren't freak out just like I learned not to while I was there, but there are concerns. The likelihood of cyberwar being the reason for failure is really low. In event of a war, Russian and DPRK both use those older methods because they are less hackable. They would, however, still almost instantly lose in such a missal war but only after doing massive damage Japan or Hawai. This is a bargaining table and there is very little the US can do unless it wants to use an ICBM itself. This puts South Korea and Japan in a shit situation, but Japan wants to re-militarize and has the technology now.
A lot of the future of the ROK depends on the the upcoming election, now that daughter of the former dictator and really weirdly scandal ridden Park administration is over, it's time for a change. A change that is willing to do some complicated negotiations between China, Japan, and the US. Moon Jae-in make be able to return Korea's Democratic party to same status after the Roh Moo-hyun's suicide and the collapse of the Sunshine policy. Conservatives in Korea have been split between Protestants, represented by Lee Myung-bak and the Grand National Party and Buddhists represented by Park Geun-hye and Liberty Korea (which split from Lee's Grand National Party), although it's important to know that Park was completely secular with cultural ties to Buddhists and Catholics (like Roh Moo-hyun actually). Lee was seen as Korea's slightly more moderate George Bush whereas there is little US analogue to Park (although maybe Trump in time).
Given that Japan is scrambling jets now to deal with China, not the DPRK, things are about to get complicated.
- At first, I chalked it up to nostalgia and simplicity--there is a necessarily minimalist aesthetic to this kind of blogging. I started using this in 2001, although my best-friend got me reading it as early 1999. She kept her blog running until just before I left for the Republic of Korea. I remember remarking to her about "the weird narcissism of keeping a public journal" as I started training in anthropology and journalism in Uni. We all have our small hypocrisies, but I was also wrong about that. As a form of social media, LJ style blogging was, in some ways, the least shallowly narcissistic form of social media, in that requires sustained engagement with others and some patience with the longer-form thoughts of others.
- The facebook algorithm has been much maligned as "social media creating echo chambers" which it does. However, this has been built into the media since about 2011. When Facebook encourages large friends lists so you can see pictures, market yourself, etc., but it means no one can management them all. There the likes and sharing became a proxy for what would be prioritized in your feed. Not just who says it, but what they say. You can get around this, but it is difficult. Furthermore, to encourage selling access, the promotion of personal blogs and the notes function have been deliberately made less efficient. So you get what facebook thinks you already want, you get lots of it, and you get lots of centralized functionality like the days of AOL or Compuserve for those of us who remember those services. My facebook feed resembles my most recent rant, not even a good sub-section of everyone I know; the results of this leveling has been increased envy though, and more and more of my Facebook friends, particularly the political active ones, have to regularly nuke their profiles and use only messenger, which remains the best way to contact non-local friends. IN fact, multiple studies show that more facebook usage correlates STRONGLY to depression. This kind of status anxiety didn't seem to emerge as much as journaling because people tended to be more intimate and even banal about what they say in writing versus what they show.
- There is little way to make this kind of blogging "profitable" so the need to turn everything into clickbait just isn't there. It's hard to fight though in more public blogging where you can make a social media personality turn into a larger media figure. As a podcaster and writer, making hyperbolic attacks on the sloppiness of Neil Degrasse-Tyson or commenting on people misunderstanding Trump developments with highly charged titles got my blog hits, but also shallowed out a lot of what I was writing. Getting people to think critically about the difference between Al-jazeera in English (which is highly "left-liberal") and Al-jazeera in Arabic, which more clearly reflects the concerns of the Qatari state and its relationship to conservative Islamic elements, and why that might be case, didn't get nearly as much hits as making fun of a meme or using obscene amounts of hyperbole.